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Can the Supreme Court halt the ongoing expansion of vicarious liability?  Barclays and 
Morrison in the UK Supreme Court.   
 




In the last twenty years, vicarious liability in tort has undergone a transformation.  From 
2001,1  the doctrine has expanded to include a wide category of relationships and tortious 
activities for which the defendant [D2] (usually the employer of the tortfeasor [D1]) will be 
held strictly liable. It is now clear that the doctrine applies to both intentional and non-
intentional torts and that two key elements are required: 2  
 
• a relationship between D1 and D2 capable of giving rise to vicarious liability; and  
• a connection that links the relationship between D1 and D2 and the tortious act or 
omission of D1.  
 
Expansion of the doctrine has, perhaps unsurprisingly, brought uncertainty, as litigants test its 
boundaries.  This has led to a rapid growth of cases, including six judgments from the House 
of Lords/Supreme Court between 2001-2017, three Privy Council decisions over the same 
period, and numerous Court of Appeal and lower court judgments.  Attempts by the Supreme 
Court in 20123  to take stock of the law and provide greater guidance, and again in 2016,4 have 
failed to stem the flow of cases. The Supreme Court itself has described vicarious liability as a 
doctrine ‘on the move’5 which has ‘not yet come to a stop’.6  In 2017,7 the Supreme Court 
confirmed the ongoing expansion of the doctrine, which would now include foster parents 
caring for children on behalf of a local authority. Parallel to such developments, in 2013 the 
Supreme Court reviewed and reformulated the law relating to non-delegable duties which 
render the employer liable for the torts of independent contractors working for him or her, 
albeit on the basis of primary liability.8    
 
Such a period of expansion has raised concerns how far the doctrine can be stretched.   On 1 
April 2020, the Supreme Court sought to answer this question, delivering two companion 
judgments addressing the question of the relationship [Barclays Bank plc v Various Claimants 
(Barclays9] and connection [Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc v Various Claimants (Morrison)10] 
 
* Professor of Law, University of Bristol.  This article is based on a paper delivered at a seminar at the University 
of Sheffield and the author would like to thank the organisers and attendees and Stephen Bailey for their helpful 
comments. 
1 Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2001] UKHL 22; [2001] 1 AC 215 (Lister). 
2 Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society [2012] UKSC 56; [2013] 2 AC 1, hereafter CCWS, para 21. 
3 CCWS ibid. 
4 Cox v Ministry of Justice [2016] UKSC 10; [2016] AC 660 (Cox), Mohamud v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc 
[2016] UKSC 11; [2016] AC 677 (Mohamud).  
5 CCWS supra n 2, para 19 per Lord Phillips. 
6 Cox supra n 4, para 1. 
7 Armes v Nottinghamshire County Council [2017] UKSC 60; [2018] AC 355 (Armes). 
8 Woodland v Essex CC [2013] UKSC 66; [2014] AC 537.  On the tensions between vicarious liability and non-
delegable duties, see S Deakin, ‘Organisational torts: vicarious liability versus non-delegable duty’ (2018) 77 CLJ 
15; J Morgan, ‘Vicarious liability for independent contractors?’  (2015) 31 PN 235, and classically G Williams, 
‘Liability for Independent Contractors’ (1956) 14 CLJ 180. 
9 [2020] UKSC 13; [2020] AC 973. 




giving rise to vicarious liability. The same five judges decided both cases.11 In the words of 
Lady Hale in Barclays, the time had come to see ‘how far that move can take it’.12  Without 
doubt, these are significant decisions; potentially the most important decisions since Lister or 
at least CCWS.  They seek, once and for all, to provide guidance on the application of the 
relationship and connection tests for vicarious liability and respond to criticism (both judicial 
and academic) that the doctrine was being applied too generously;13 criticism that has included 
courts internal and external to the UK.14   Crucially, both decisions seek to constrain the 
expansion of the doctrine by adopting more restrictive interpretations of both the relationship 
and connection requirements.  They further address the theoretical foundations of vicarious 
liability and the impact of sexual abuse cases on the development of the doctrine. An unstated, 
but implicit, aim is to stem the tide of vicarious liability cases. 
 
This article, while welcoming the Supreme Court’s decision to provide greater guidance in this 
area of law, will seek to examine the extent to which the UK Supreme Court is likely to succeed 
in its goals.  It will do so in three stages, first by examining how Barclays has clarified the 
relationship test, second by examining how Morrison has corrected misunderstandings about 
the connection test, and finally by reviewing the impact of these cases more generally on this 
area of the law of tort.   In so doing, it will answer two crucial questions.  First, do these 
decisions mark a new era for vicarious liability claims or will the uncertainties of the last 20 
years continue?  Secondly, can Barclays and Morrison halt once and for all the ongoing 
expansion of vicarious liability?  
 
 
2.  Understanding the relationship test: Barclays Bank v Various Claimants 
It is undisputed that, in the vast majority of cases, the relationship that gives rise to vicarious 
liability will be that of employer and employee.15 However, as the Supreme Court made clear 
in the Catholic Child Welfare case (CCWS), in a minority of cases, relationships ‘akin to 
employment’ will also satisfy the relationship test. 16   It is this category that has caused 
controversy in that it extends vicarious liability to parties who are technically independent 
contractors.  This is significant in that it is long established that vicarious liability does not 
apply to the acts of independent contractors. 17  The breadth of the ‘akin to employment’ 
category will therefore be important in determining the scope of the doctrine and the dividing 
line between employees on one hand, and true independent contractors for whom vicarious 
liability does not apply.  Case-law has resolved that where the worker is performing on behalf 
of an enterprise (as opposed to his or her own behalf) and his or her activities are integrated 
 
11 Lady Hale and Lords Reed, Kerr, Hodge and Lloyd-Jones JJSC. 
12 Barclays Bank supra n 9, para 1. 
13 See, for example, J Plunkett, ‘Taking stock of vicarious liability’ (2016) 132 LQR 556 and P Morgan, ‘Certainty 
in vicarious liability: a quest for a chimaera?’ (2016) 75 CLJ 202, 205 who stressed the need for the courts to 
establish the limits of vicarious liability and provide greater certainty to litigants.  See also P Giliker, ‘Vicarious 
liability in the Supreme Court’ (2016) 7 UKSC Yearbook 152. 
14 See, notably, the critical decision of the High Court of Australia in Prince Alfred College v ADC [2016] HCA 
37; (2016) 258 CLR 134.  Lower courts in England and Wales have also expressed concern that the boundaries 
of this form of strict liability continue to prove difficult to identify, see, for example, Judge Cotter QC in Bellman 
v Northampton Recruitment Ltd [2016] EWHC 3104 (QB); [2017] ICR 543, para. 46 (his concerns validated when 
his decision was later overturned by the Court of Appeal: [2018] EWCA Civ 2214). 
15 CCWS supra n 2, para 35. 
16 Approving the ‘impressive’ leading judgment of Ward LJ in JGE (or E) v English Province of Our Lady of 
Charity [2012] EWCA Civ 938; [2013] QB 722. 
17 D & F Estates Ltd v Church Comrs [1989] AC 177, 208 per Lord Bridge; Salsbury v Woodland [1970] 1 QB 




into the organisational structure of that enterprise, then, despite the absence of a formal contract 
of employment, vicarious liability will apply.18 On this basis, a priest (an office-holder) may 
be regarded as akin to an employee of a bishop;19 brother teachers in a religious school akin to 
employees of the religious organisation.20 The Supreme Court in later decisions confirmed that 
even prisoners serving in the prison kitchen as part of their rehabilitation could be regarded as 
‘akin to employees’ (Cox v Ministry of Justice21), as were foster parents volunteering22 to 
undertake the care of children placed under local authority control (Armes v Nottinghamshire 
CC23).   
In Barclays, the Supreme Court faced once again the question of the scope of ‘akin to 
employment’ relationship.  Would it extend to a doctor who undertook, as a minor part of his 
practice, health checks for existing or potential employees of Barclays Bank? These were 
conducted in the doctor’s consulting room in his own home.  The bank would arrange the 
appointment with the doctor (now deceased) and ask him to fill in a form which contained their 
logo and was entitled, ‘Barclays Confidential Medical Report’.  While not paid a retainer, the 
doctor had been paid a fee per examination.  In a group action, 126 claimants alleged that 
Barclays should be found vicariously liable for sexual assaults committed during these 
examinations between 1968 and 1984.  The doctor was not a bank employee, but he was a 
worker entrusted with the task of ensuring that the bank hired fit and healthy employees who 
could be recommended for life insurance at ordinary rates under the Bank’s pension scheme.  
Was the doctor then ‘akin’ to a Barclays’ employee? 
At first instance and in the Court of Appeal, a positive response had been given. Irwin L.J. in 
the Court of Appeal had gone so far as to question the existence of any ‘bright line’ test between 
independent contractors and employees.  While such a distinction might make the law clearer 
and less complex, he noted, ‘ease of business cannot displace or circumvent the principles now 
established by the Supreme Court.’24  The Supreme Court in Barclays, however, disagreed.  
Importantly, it reasserted the classic distinction between work done for an employer as part of 
the business of that employer and work done by an independent contractor as part of the 
business of that contractor. 25    Extending vicarious liability to relationships ‘akin to 
employment’, it stated, did not erode this key distinction.  The focus of the courts should be on 
the details of the parties’ relationship and, fundamentally, whether the tortfeasor was carrying 
out his own independent business. On the facts, the doctor was not, in the view of the Court, 
‘anything close to an employee’, but rather equivalent to a window-cleaner hired to clean the 
bank’s windows or an auditor hired to audit its books.26 The Court also noted that the doctor 
had been free to refuse an examination should he wish to do so: ‘He was in business on his 
 
18 Viasystems (Tyneside) Ltd v Thermal Transfer (Northern) Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 1151; [2006] QB 510, para 
79 per Rix LJ.  
19 JGE supra n 16. 
20 CCWS supra n 2. This is in addition to the vicarious liability of the School itself for its teachers. 
21 Cox supra n 4. 
22 Only expenses are covered in such arrangements. 
23 Armes supra n 7. 
24 [2018] EWCA Civ 1670; [2018] IRLR 947, para 61. Silink argues that the decision breached the wall that had 
historically been set around independent contractors: A Silink, ‘Vicarious Liability of a Bank for the Acts of a 
Contracted Doctor’ (2018) 34 PN 46.  
25 Barclays Bank supra n 9, paras 22-24 
26 This may be regarded as a bit of an exaggeration given the doctor’s role in the Barclays Bank recruitment 
process (as opposed to a window cleaner for whom Barclays is just another client).  It is perhaps best to regard 




own account as a medical practitioner with a portfolio of patients and clients. One of those 
clients was the Bank’.27 
In advocating a more pragmatic approach that focuses on the details of the parties’ relationship, 
the Supreme Court was encouraging a move towards a more cautious, incremental approach.  
Two key threads underlie this judgment which merit greater consideration and will be 
examined in detail below.  First, the Court sought to provide guidance on the line to be drawn 
between employees/those akin to employees and independent contractors.  Secondly, the Court 
addressed head on the role policy should play in determining the scope of the ‘akin to 
employment’ test. In CCWS,28 Lord Phillips had highlighted five policy factors that would 
indicate when it was fair, just and reasonable to find a relationship ‘akin to employment’.  These 
have proven influential, not least in permitting the courts to justify extensions of the ‘akin to 
employment’ relationship. In reviewing the role of policy, the Court was seeking to establish 
the limits of the relationship needed to establish vicarious liability.  As Lord Steyn stated in 
Bernard v AG of Jamaica, ‘[t]he principle of vicarious liability is not infinitely extendable.’29 
(i) Identifying employees, those ‘akin to employees’ and independent contractors 
 
It is trite law that vicarious liability does not apply to independent contractors. Lord Sumption 
in Woodland v Essex CC in 2013 confidently stated that ‘[t]he boundaries of vicarious liability 
have been expanded by recent decisions … But it has never extended to the negligence of those 
who are truly independent contractors’.30  Yet what, we may ask, is the difference between 
‘true’ independent contractors and ‘false’ independent contractors who are now treated as akin 
to employees? This question was addressed by the Supreme Court in Cox and Armes, which 
found assistance in addressing the policy factors highlighted by Lord Phillips in CCWS, namely 
who has deeper pockets; whether the worker was undertaking a task delegated by the employer; 
whether the worker was integrated into business activity of the employer; whether the employer 
created the risk of wrongdoing; and the level of control.31  In Armes, these policy factors 
encouraged a generous approach.  Vicarious liability could be justified, then, on the basis that 
foster parents were an integral part of child protection services in that they discharged the 
caring duties of local authority by looking after children in care.  They could not, in the Court’s 
view, be seen as carrying on an independent business of their own. In so finding, the Court 
placed emphasis on the fact that the local authority's placement of children in care with foster 
parents had created the risk of abuse, it had exercised powers of approval, inspection, 
supervision and removal without any parallel in ordinary family life, and that most foster 
parents had insufficient means to be able to meet a substantial award of damage.32 Given the 
complex nature of the fostering relationship, undoubtedly policy here helped tip the 
relationship into the category of ‘akin to employment’.33 This raised the question: how far 
should this reasoning be stretched?  The subsequent case of Kafagi v JBW Group 
 
27 Barclays Bank supra n 9, para 28. 
28 CCWS supra n 2, para 35. 
29 [2004] UKPC 47; [2005] IRLR 398, para 23. 
30 [2013] UKSC 66, para 3. 
31 CCWS supra n 2, para 35. There seems some divergence between the view in Cox (stated by Lord Reed) that 
the five factors stated by Lord Phillips are not all equally significant, downplaying control and deeper pockets 
(para 20), and Armes, where Lord Reed found all five policy factors to be helpful.  
32 Armes supra n 7, paras 59-63.   
33 Contrast the position in Canada where vicarious liability is denied (KLB v British Columbia 2003 SCC 51, 
(2003) 230 DLR (4th) 513) and in New Zealand where the courts found it necessary to rely on agency to impose 




Ltd34 represented an attempt to extend the ‘akin to employment’ relationship beyond that of 
Armes. It was left for the Court of Appeal to confirm that a judicial services company which 
had sub-contracted the collection of council tax debts to a self-employed bailiff (Boylan) was 
not vicariously liable for the actions of its sub-contractors. Boylan had paid his own bond to 
the court, could work for whosoever he chose, hired his own assistant, and maintained his own 
indemnity insurance.  As the Court commented, he was more a potential competitor to the 
company than someone integrated within its business.35  What is worrying about Kafagi is not 
the decision (which is obviously correct), but the fact that what should have been a 
straightforward ‘true’ independent contractor case reached the Court of Appeal.  It is worth 
noting that, in giving leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, the court had given as its reason 
uncertainty present in the law.36  
 
The Supreme Court in Barclays sought, therefore, to provide reassurance that the distinction 
between employees/akin to employees and independent contractors remains and can be 
identified with some degree of clarity. To determine a relationship ‘which makes it proper for 
the law to make the one pay for the fault of the other’,37  parties should focus on the details of 
the relationship and its closeness to that of employment.  The Lord Phillips five policy factors 
are relegated to ‘doubtful cases’ where assistance is needed to determine whether the 
relationship is sufficiently analogous to employment to make it fair, just and reasonable to 
impose vicarious liability.  This represents a retrenchment and an attempt to adopt a more 
principled, predicable approach. As Lady Hale mildly remarked: 
 
There appears to have been a tendency to elide the policy reasons for the doctrine of the employer’s liability for 
the acts of his employee … with the principles which should guide the development of that liability into 
relationships which are not employment but which are sufficiently akin to employment to make it fair and just to 
impose such liability. 38 
 
It is important to note that, in so doing, Barclays is not attacking the ‘akin to employment’ 
category of relationships, but rather seeking to clarify its scope. The UK courts have rightly 
recognised that changing patterns of employment have brought a need for employment and tort 
law to recognise that workers may be part of the workforce of an organisation even if they are 
not hired under a contract of employment. The law must adapt in the face of the increasing 
complexity and sophistication of enterprises in the 21st century where workers may be hired 
via agencies on insecure short-term or temporary contracts.  In recognising the realities of the 
gig economy, then, legal rules must evolve and the creation of a category of workers ‘akin to 
employees’ represents a response to such change.  This does not mean, however, that ‘true’ 
independent contractors do not continue to exist.  Where it is clear that the worker is carrying 
on his own independent business, policy should have no role. Barclays fundamentally asserts 
that, in most cases, the courts should focus on the facts of the relationship, not policy.39    
 
34  [2018] EWCA Civ 1157.  
35 Kafagi ibid, para 53.  
36 Permission to appeal being granted on 6 February 2017 by Floyd LJ. Note also the concerns of the Singapore 
Court of Appeal in Ng Huat Seng v Munib Mohammad Madni [2017] SGCA 58, paras 63-64 per Menon C.J that 
the Supreme Court decisions pre-2020 might be interpreted to overturn the accepted view that there is no vicarious 
liability for independent contractors, noted by D Tan (2018) 134 LQR 193. 
37 Barclays Bank supra n 9, para 1 per Lady Hale for the Court. Emphasis added. 
38 Barclays Bank supra n 9, para 16. 
39 D Nolan, ‘Reining in vicarious liability’ (2020) 49 ILJ 609, 616-617 argues, however, that in emphasising the 
distinction between employers and independent contractors, courts will need to be alert to the fact that there will 
be an incentive for employers to seek to pre-empt vicarious liability by dressing their workers in the clothing of 




If we review previous case-law, it seems clear that the priests and brother teachers will continue 
to satisfy this test; the Court of Appeal in JGE, for example, examining in detail whether the 
factual relationship of priest and bishop could be categorised as akin to that of employment.40  
Equally, there seems little issue with the prisoner in Cox who was effectively doing a job 
equivalent to that of a prison employee.  Armes, however, is a different story.  Local authorities 
do employ staff to look after children in care.  Foster parents are a distinct category.41 The 
Court described Armes as ‘the most difficult case’,42 and we might regard it as an exemplar 
therefore of the doubtful case category where assistance is needed to determine whether the 
relationship is sufficiently analogous to employment to make it fair, just and reasonable to 
impose vicarious liability.  Armes does, however, highlight the potential Achilles’ heel of 
Barclays.  To what extent will the category of ‘doubtful cases’ permit the courts to continue to 
extend the relationships giving rise to vicarious liability? 
 
 
(ii) Policy, Doubtful Cases and the Relationship Test 
 
As stated above, Barclays clarified that it is only in doubtful cases that the five policy ‘incidents’ 
identified by Lord Phillips in CCWS will be helpful in identifying a relationship ‘akin to 
employment’. 43 While this indicates that such cases should be exceptional, it is self-evident 
that the wider the scope of this exception, the more policy will continue to intrude into the ‘akin 
to employment’ test.  Armes, as argued above, would appear to fall into this category. The 
majority in that case found that the foster parents were not, in fact, operating their own business, 
but this conclusion was reinforced by reference to policy. 44   How, then, do we identify 
‘doubtful’ cases?  Will not any barrister struggling to establish a relationship giving rise to 
vicarious liability argue that hers is a doubtful case?  We might argue that such cases should 
be confined to those which are borderline, but what makes a borderline case? 
 
Logically, a borderline case will arise where the claimant can establish the essential minimum 
of the employee relationship (that is, that the tortfeasor is acting as an integral part of the 
defendant’s enterprise),45 but where uncertainty remains whether it is sufficiently analogous to 
that of a conventional employment relationship.  Interpreted narrowly, this seems consistent 
with Lady Hale’s overall approach in Barclays, but the question is whether courts will adhere 
to a narrow approach.  One further factor not discussed in Barclays is whether the courts will 
be more inclined to regard cases as ‘doubtful’ where sexual abuse is alleged, given the 
sensitivity of such claims and the flexible approach taken in previous case-law.  The first post-
Barclays case offers some support for the latter suggestion.  Here, the High Court faced a claim 
of abuse by a lay night watchman working for a religious school.46  The facts were similar to 
those found in CCWS but with a crucial difference.  In CCWS, dual vicarious liability had been 
found where teachers, who were religious brothers, had abused pupils in the school (divided 
between the school managers and the religious foundation of which the brothers were 
 
40 JGE supra n 16, paras 74-81 per Ward LJ. 
41 For the complex issues involved with fostering, see P Morgan, ‘Ripe for reconsideration: Foster carers, context, 
and vicarious liability’ (2012) 20 Torts LJ 110.  
42 Barclays Bank supra n 9, para 23. 
43 Barclays Bank supra n 9, para 27. 
44 Contrast Lord Hughes (dissenting) who argued that fostering commits children in care to independent carers 
and is the equivalent to the authority placing the children in a specialist home run by a different authority or by a 
charity: Armes supra n 7, para 88.   
45 Cox supra n 4, para 24. 
46 JXJ v The Province of Great Britain of the Institute of Brothers of the Christian Schools [2020] EWHC 1914 




members). Here, the culprit was a lay member of staff with no religious affiliation. The Court 
rightly saw this as straightforward – any claim of vicarious liability would be against the school 
alone. All that could be shown was that the religious organisation exercised considerable de 
facto control over the operation and organisation of the school, rather than individual lay 
employees. 47   In such a case, there can be little doubt on the relationship question, but 
nevertheless the court did proceed to justify its conclusion by referencing the five Phillips 
policy incidents.48  Was this over-caution or a sense that such a review will always be wise in 
abuse cases?  If the latter, will this be confined to sexual abuse cases or extend to physical 
abuse given that in many cases both allegations are made?   
 
It is likely therefore that the courts will face future challenges to the boundaries of the law and 
that policy arguments will continue to be raised.  While labelling Armes a difficult case may 
be read as implicit disapproval of its reasoning, indicating its limited utility as a basis for future 
case-law development, Armes is not overturned.  This leads to two conclusions.  First, that 
Barclays indicates that a more cautious approach should be taken to the ‘akin to employment’ 
relationship and that the starting point should be the details of the parties’ relationship.  Second, 
that, despite its best efforts, Barclays is unlikely to prevent further attempts to expand the 
relationship concept.  
 
 
3. Understanding the connection test: Morrison Supermarkets v Various Claimants 
 
In Morrison, in contrast, the Supreme Court sought to provide guidance as to the operation of 
the connection test.  In so doing, the Court both revisited the test and sought to correct any 
misunderstandings that might have arisen from its 2016 decision in Mohamud leading to 
concerns that the test was too lenient.  Both elements will be examined more closely below. 
 
(i) Identifying a connection: Close or sufficient? 
 
The connection test is fundamental to the doctrine of vicarious liability in that it both 
determines the scope of the doctrine and the reason why employers (rather than any other 
defendant) are held liable.  Prior to Lister v Hesley Hall, the Salmond test had been used.  This 
test imposed vicarious liability where the tort could be said to be a wrongful and unauthorised 
mode of doing some task authorised by the employer.49 Faced with a claim for sexual abuse, 
which could not legitimately be described as a wrongful mode of doing one’s job, the House 
of Lords in 2001 opted for a broader test. In the words of Lord Steyn, vicarious liability would 
arise where the employee’s torts could be said to be so closely connected with his employment 
that it would be fair and just to hold the employers vicariously liable.50  Lord Millett offered 
an alternative (arguably slightly narrower) formulation: are the unauthorised acts of the 
employee so connected with acts which the employer has authorised that they may properly be 
 
47 McKinstry was therefore regarded as an integral part of the work, business and organisation of the School, but 
not of the Institute: ibid, para 140 per Chamberlain J. 
48 Ibid, para 144. 
49 Introduced by Sir John Salmond in the first edition of Salmond on Torts (London: Stevens and Haynes, 1907), 
pp 83–8 and repeated in later editions. Salmond also advised that vicarious liability would arise if the tortious 
behaviour had been expressly or impliedly authorised by the employer, although this might be regarded as primary, 
rather than secondary, liability. 




regarded as being within the scope of his employment?51  Both versions of the test were 
endorsed by Lord Nicholls in the later case of Dubai Aluminium.52 Lord Toulson, however, in 
Mohamud preferred a different formulation, arguing that it was desirable to simplify the 
essence of the test:  
 
In the simplest terms, the court has to consider two matters. The first question is what functions or ‘field of 
activities’ have been entrusted by the employer to the employee, or, in everyday language, what was the nature of 
his job.  …  Secondly, the court must decide whether there was sufficient connection between the position in 
which he was employed and his wrongful conduct to make it right for the employer to be held liable under the 
principle of social justice.53 
 
In the case itself, Lord Toulson found a racist attack by a kiosk attendant on a customer on the 
garage forecourt amounted to a foul-mouthed and violent means of ensuring Mohamud left his 
employer’s premises. The attendant’s racist motivation was deemed irrelevant.  Equally, 
applying a test of ‘sufficient’ connection, a drunken punch at a post-Christmas party drinking 
session was regarded as ‘in the course of one’s employment’,54  as was a fight and a chase 
around a building site culminating with one labourer striking another with a scaffolding pole.55 
Lord Phillips in the earlier case of CCWS had also highlighted that, in abuse cases at least, in 
applying the connection test, the creation of risk policy factor was always likely to be 
important.56  In so doing, his Lordship had drawn on Canadian case-law (which had been 
approved in Lister 57 ) which asked whether the risk of wrongdoing had been created or 
materially increased by the nature of the defendant’s enterprise. Lord Toulson went further in 
Mohamud (a decision concerning physical, not sexual, abuse): ‘The risk of an employee 
misusing his position is one of life's unavoidable facts.’58   
 
Mohamud raised concerns amongst commentators that a test based on sufficient connection 
and risk would be far too readily satisfied.  It was condemned by the High Court of Australia 
in Prince Alfred College v ADC59 on this basis. The HCA favoured a more restrictive test that 
focused on the particular features of the parties’ relationship and whether they provided the 
occasion for the wrongful act.60 Courts, in its view, should search for principle rather than 
formulate policy.  Mohamud, on this basis, had been wrongly decided.61 
 
51 Lister ibid, para 69. Lord Steyn opined, however, in Bernard v AG of Jamaica supra n 29, para18 that ‘the four 
substantial opinions delivered in Lister revealed that all the Law Lords agreed that [his version] stated the right 
question’, indicating he saw no difference between the two versions. 
52 Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam [2002] UKHL 48; [2003] 2 AC 366, para 23. See also Lord Nicholls’ 
judgment in Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’ NHS Trust [2006] UKHL 34; [2007] 1 AC 224. 
53 Mohamud supra n 4, paras 44-45 (emphasis added). 
54 Bellman v Northampton Recruitment Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2214; [2019] ICR 459: sufficient connection where 
the managing director had been exerting his authority in a drunken argument at 3am. It was not merely a question 
of a group of drunken revellers whose conversation had turned to work. 
55 Levitt v Euro Building and Maintenance Contractors Ltd [2019] EWHC 2926 (QB) where the fact that the 
assault was carried out in the workplace, following an argument about work materials, using work equipment, 
was enough to convince the court that this was not a frolic case. This sets the bar very low indeed. Cf Graham v 
Commercial Bodyworks Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 47. 
56 CCWS supra n 2, para 87. 
57 See Bazley v Curry [1999] 2 SCR 534; (1999) 174 DLR (4th) 45 and Jacobi v Griffiths [1999] 2 SCR 570; 
(1999) 174 DLR (4th) 71.  These decisions were described as ‘luminous and illuminating’ in Lister v Hesley Hall 
supra n 1: para 27 per Lord Steyn, although the House of Lords at that time was more equivocal about their 
underlying reasoning. 
58 Mohamud supra n 4, para 40. 
59 Prince Alfred College [2016] HCA 37, (2016) 258 CLR 134 (a sexual abuse case). 
60 Prince Alfred College ibid, para 81.  




The application of the ‘sufficient’ connection test and the role of the policy came to the fore in 
Morrison. Here a senior auditor (Skelton), employed by Morrison Supermarkets, had a grudge 
against his employer and had used his home computer to place confidential data about Morrison 
employees on the internet.  The employees, whose data had been disclosed, sued Morrison for 
breach of the statutory duty under the Data Protection Act 1998, misuse of private information, 
and breach of confidence.  The Court of Appeal found Morrison to be vicariously liable for 
Skelton’s torts.  His tortious acts in sending the claimants' data to third parties were found to 
be within the field of activities assigned to him by Morrison. This was regardless of the fact 
that Skelton’s motive had been to harm Morrison (and vicarious liability would assist him in 
this goal).62  The Supreme Court disagreed.  Skelton had been pursuing a personal vendetta.  
His wrongful conduct ‘was not so closely connected with acts which he was authorised to do 
that, for the purposes of Morrisons’ liability to third parties, it can fairly and properly be 
regarded as done by him while acting in the ordinary course of his employment.’63 
 
The language used by the Court is significant and should be read carefully.  The connection is 
no longer described as ‘sufficient’ but ‘close’.64  The connection is to ‘acts which [Skelton] 
was authorised to do’.  This is the tighter formulation used by Lord Millett in Lister and Lord 
Nicholls in Dubai Aluminium, not the broader formula of Lord Toulson in Mohamud.  This 
terminological shift is far from accidental.  Having examined how the close connection test had 
been expressed in Lister and Dubai Aluminium, the Court determined that the simpler version 
of the test in Mohamud had not been intended to change the content of the test. Lord Toulson’s 
judgment had to be read in context.65 It was not, as commentators had suggested, indicative of 
a move towards a test of temporal or causal connection between the employment and 
wrongdoing, nor setting out a broad test of social justice. If, therefore, Mohamud is read in the 
light of Lister and Dubai, Skelton’s disclosure of data could not be seen as part of his field of 
activities. While there was a causal connection between his post and the tort, this would not 
satisfy a test of close connection.   
 
(ii) Mohamud: Not wrong, but misunderstood … 
 
The language of the Court in Morrison is one of reassurance. Mohamud was not wrongly 
decided, just misunderstood.  In moving from ‘sufficient’ back to ‘close’ connection, the Court 
was simply seeking to correct any misunderstandings a simplified version of the connection 
test may have caused.  I would strongly argue, however, that Morrison disguises a potentially 
radical judgment in sheep’s clothing.  The misunderstandings in question are fundamental in 
nature, relating to the nature of the connection test itself.  Reference to ‘sufficient connection’ 
in Mohamud had been viewed by both commentators and the lower courts as an attempt to 
relax the ‘close’ connection test. Plunkett, post-Mohamud, for example, had argued that, in 
view of the apparently liberal understanding of the connection test in Mohamud, ‘findings that 
an employee was on a “frolic of their own” are now bound to be few and far between’.66  First 
 
62 [2018] EWCA Civ 2339; [2019] QB 772, paras 72-76.  
63 Morrison supra n 1, para 47 per Lord Reed. 
64 It is worrying that the first post-Morrison decision applied the Morrison test but still referred to it as a test of 
‘sufficient connection’: Chell v Tarmac Cement and Lime Ltd [2020] EWHC 2613 (QB). This may be a one-off 
mistake given the pre-Morrison terminology of the pleadings and case appealed, but Chell does highlight the need 
for practitioners and the courts alike to recognise that Morrison does require a change of language and a different 
approach to the connection test. 
65 Morrison supra n 10, paras 26-28. 
66 J Plunkett, ‘Taking stock of vicarious liability’ (2016) 132 LQR 556, 561. See also D Ryan, ‘"Close connection" 
and “akin to employment”: Perspectives on 50 years of radical developments in vicarious liability’ [2016] Irish 




instance and appeal courts (including those in Morrison) had treated Lord Toulson’s broad and 
evaluative approach as authoritative. 67   Morrison, however, directs us back to the earlier 
formulation of the ‘close’ connection test in Dubai Aluminium which is both narrower and, 
significantly, resembles the most conservative formulation of the test stated in Lister.   In so 
doing, the Court was able to blow out of the water suggestions that the connection test might 
be based on causation or opportunity. 
 
Further ‘misunderstandings’ related to the question of motive and policy. In Mohamud, Lord 
Toulson had commented that ‘Mr Khan's motive is irrelevant. It looks obvious that he was 
motivated by personal racism rather than a desire to benefit his employer's business, but that is 
neither here nor there’. 68 This had encouraged the claimant in Morrison to argue that Skelton’s 
motive to harm Morrison should, on this basis, be disregarded. In rejecting this argument, the 
Court argued that Lord Toulson’s words needed to be placed in context.  His statement that the 
motive was irrelevant did not mean … that motive is irrelevant. Rather it was irrelevant on the 
facts of Mohamud.  This clearly needs unpacking.  The Court argued that having already 
determined that Khan was acting in his capacity as an employee, Lord Toulson was merely 
stating that why he chose so to act did not matter.69  Motive, then, is relevant where the question 
whether the employee is acting in his capacity as an employee is still open, for example, where 
he or she had not been engaged in furthering the employer's business but had been pursuing his 
own interests (as was the case in Morrison itself).  Such reasoning makes sense if you consider 
Lister itself.  It is only possible to conclude that sexual abuse is closely connected to authorised 
acts that furthered the employer’s business if one casts to one side the issue of the employee’s 
personal motivation in committing the acts in question. Similar issues arise in theft cases.70  If 
we accept this reasoning and impose vicarious liability, then we must also accept that the key 
question becomes that of the capacity in which the employee acts.  Unfortunately, this may not 
be as clear-cut as Morrison envisages.  For example, post-Morrison, are we all now convinced 
that Mr Khan was acting to further his employee’s business thus rendering his motive irrelevant?  
Or rather was he a racist attacking a random individual who just happened to be a customer 
turning up at his workplace?   
 
Finally, the Court addressed misunderstandings as to the relevance of the Phillips five policy 
factors.  They did not, stated the Court, concern both stages of the vicarious liability test but 
are confined to the ‘akin to employment’ test (with an exception made for sexual abuse cases 
that require a tailored response).71  This is a very narrow reading of CCWS, but does have the 
required effect of removing a key feature that permitted extensions to the connection test.  On 
this basis, in Morrison, a non-sexual abuse case, the Phillips policy factors would be irrelevant.   
 
 
67 See, for example, Morrison [2018] EWCA Civ 2339 and [2017] EWHC 3113 (QB); [2019] QB 772 and 
Bellman v Northampton Recruitment Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2214. Bellman was not overturned by the Supreme 
Court which, supra n 10, para 46, acknowledged that while the Court of Appeal in that case had to a certain extent 
misunderstood Mohamud, nevertheless the correct result had been reached, in that there was a very close 
connection between the managing director's authorised activities as an employee and his commission of the assault 
68 Mohamud supra n 4, para 48. 
69 Similarly, Lord Toulson’s reference to ‘an unbroken sequence of events’ and ‘a seamless episode’ were not 
indicative of a test of temporal or causal connection and to read them as such would be to read them out of context. 
They merely referred to the question of the capacity in which Mr Khan was acting when the events in question 
took place: Morrison supra n 10, para 28. 
70 Lloyd v Grace, Smith & Co [1912] A.C. 716 (where employee’s personal motivation of greed was ignored). 
71 Morrison supra n 10, paras 23 and 36. This was a necessary concession given the dicta of Lord Phillips in 




Stepping back, what are we to make of such reasoning?  At the very least, the Supreme Court 
is interpreting the Mohamud test as conservatively as possible. However, I would argue that 
the judgment goes further than this.  What is described as a ‘clarification’ of the connection 
test essentially restates the test, using the wording of Lord Nicholls in Dubai Aluminium. 
Indeed, taking ‘policy’ out of the connection test might be regarded as a radical step indeed.  
In drawing on Dubai Aluminium, the Supreme Court advocated not simply a narrower test, but 
also a more principled-form of case-law development.  Judges should in future: 
 
 … consider how the guidance derived from decided cases furnishes a solution to the case before the court. Judges 
should therefore identify from the decided cases the factors or principles which point towards or away from 
vicarious liability in the case before the court, and which explain why it should or should not be imposed. 
Following that approach, cases can be decided on a basis which is principled and consistent.72 
 
Although the HCA decision in Prince Alfred College is not mentioned (which, it may be 
recalled, argued that Mohamud had been wrongly decided), the Supreme Court’s approach is 
reminiscent of the Australian court’s advocacy of principled case-law development rather than 
free-wheeling policy. As I have argued elsewhere,73 the decision in Prince Alfred College 
represented an attempt by an apex common law court to provide a test which, if applied in a 
clear and structured way, would permit the incremental and controlled growth of vicarious 
liability and provide guidance for the lower courts. The UK Supreme Court in Morrison 
appears similarly motivated.  While not adopting the ‘occasion’ test of the Australian courts,74 
Morrison places faith in incremental legal development from decided cases.   
 
The question is whether this will suffice to constrain the courts.  For some, Morrison amounts 
to little more than a practical call for judges not to be daring.75  I am not so pessimistic but 
remain concerned that the legitimate goal of seeking to place principle above policy may be 
undermined by the decision not to overturn Mohamud and Mohamud-influenced cases.  In 
seeking to view Mohamud as merely misunderstood, two consequences arise.  First, English 
law is left with a category of ‘awkward’ cases that it will struggle to explain away.  As stated 
above, some commentators, including myself, still find it difficult to view the rehabilitated 
Mohamud as representing a case where Mr Khan’s racist abuse was closely connected to acts 
he was authorised to do. Equally, in suggesting cases involving sexual abuse, which are 
unquestionably affected by policy, should be treated as a separate category of claims, risk-
based reasoning survives for another day and future courts will now have to resolve how to 
treat this category of claims. Given that many cases will involve allegations of both physical 
and sexual abuse, this is not necessarily the neat division envisaged by the Court 76  and 
essentially leaves a door open for future case-law development.  In the face of authority 
applying risk-based reasoning in non-sexual abuse cases (which has not been overturned), can 
such reasoning be confined to one pocket of claims?  One wonders whether the Supreme Court 
will live to regret this suggestion.   
 
A second consequence, I would argue, is more fundamental.  Legal scholars and practitioners 
working in this field will have read the Mohamud judgment in its entirety and diligently 
 
72 Morrison supra n 10, para 24. See also Lord Nicholls in Dubai Aluminium supra n 52, para 26. 
73 P Giliker, ‘Analysing institutional liability for child sexual abuse in England and Wales and Australia: Vicarious 
liability, non-delegable duties and statutory intervention’ (2018) 77 CLJ 506, 533. 
74 Prince Alfred College supra n 59, para 81, which identified matters such as authority, power, trust, control and 
the ability to achieve intimacy with the victim as relevant concerns. 
75 A Bell, ‘Plus ça change, plus c’est la vicarious liability’ (2020) 36 PN 150, 155: ‘Application of the [Supreme 
Court’s] ideas to any particular case may well remain as much of a lottery as before.’   




followed its application by the courts.  The Supreme Court, despite its lack of citation of 
commentary, was clearly aware of criticism that the Toulson simplified test was too generous 
and that the lower courts were interpreting the connection test extremely liberally (as evidenced 
by the lower courts in Morrison itself).  Any such critique represents part of a constructive and 
legitimate debate as to the scope of vicarious liability.  To respond to such concerns on the 
basis they represent a ‘misunderstanding’ of the law and derive in part from reading judgments 
out of context represents a matter of concern.  As common lawyers, we rely on our apex courts 
for guidance.  We are taught at an early age to identify the ratio decidendi of a case and to 
construe precedent carefully.  We trust, therefore, our courts to provide the guidance that will 
enable us to interpret the common law.  If a Court can simply argue at a later date that its 
express words have been misunderstood and taken out of context, then there is a danger that 
this relationship of trust will be detrimentally affected.  It creates uncertainty in the law and 
encourages legal challenge.  As this article has shown, objectively, it is misleading to suggest 
that Morrison merely explains Mohamud to a confused audience. It changes the law. The reality 
is that Mohamud represented a false step in the law.  It should therefore have been overturned 
in favour of a more traditional interpretation of the ‘close connection’ test.  It may be argued 
that this, de facto, is what the Supreme Court has achieved, albeit in a more subtle and tactful 
fashion without the embarrassment of formally overturning its previous decision.  I have no 
doubt that this is the intention of the Court.  Subtlety and tact, however, come at a price.   
 
 
4.  Assessing the impact of Barclays and Morrison 
 
As I have shown, Barclays and Morrison represent a potential turning point for vicarious 
liability.  Having been ‘on the move’ for so many years, the Supreme Court has indicated that 
it is time to slow down and adopt a more measured approach.  Principle is emphasised over 
policy in both cases.  Examination of the facts of the relationship and the duties allocated to 
the tortfeasor are stressed. The merits of a case-by-case incremental approach praised.  
However, as we have seen, by refusing to overturn the decisions in Armes and Mohamud, 
certain expansion joints persist.  Armes heads a potential counter-offensive of ‘doubtful’ cases, 
which both re-introduce policy reasoning into the discussion and diminish the force of Lady 
Hale’s argument that, in future, it should be the details of the relationship, not policy, that 
determine whether a relationship exists giving rise to vicarious liability. Equally, Morrison 
suggests that there will be a sub-category of sexual abuse cases where policy concerns will be 
relevant. The scope of these exceptions is ill-defined, and this will need to be resolved.  Given 
the number of vicarious liability cases in recent years that have involved some form of sexual 
abuse, this latter category may potentially provide a significant exception to the general 
approach.  As discussed earlier, it may also influence the first category of claims.  The reason 
for the exceptions is self-evident: they permit the Court to explain away, rather than reverse, 
earlier case-law that is inconsistent with its general approach it advocates.  The result, however, 
is to undermine to a certain extent its new framework by re-introducing a discussion of policy.   
 
In this final section, I will address to what extent Barclays and Morrison provide clearer 
guidance for courts given the concerns stated above. This will be approached in two ways.  
First, I will revisit earlier cases where the ‘akin to employment’ and ‘connection’ tests proved 
difficult to apply and examine to what extent the courts will now find it easier to resolve these 
questions. As will be seen, both the cases discussed below highlight ongoing uncertainties that 
will need to be resolved.  Secondly, given the development of non-delegable duties parallel to 




duties.  Will a stricter relationship test encourage parties to pursue the non-delegable duty 
argument with greater rigour? 
 
(i) Revisiting earlier case-law in the light of Barclays and Morrison  
 
DSN77 represents a case where the ‘akin to employment’ test was directly in point.  Here, the 
High Court had been asked to determine whether a football scout, abusing a young boy during 
a tour of New Zealand, had been ‘akin to an employee’.  The culprit, Roper, was an unpaid 
volunteer whose role had been to spot and coach promising players below the minimum 
schoolboy signing age of 14 for Blackpool Football Club.  Roper was later convicted of abusing 
boys in his care.  As a volunteer, he was clearly not an employee, but Griffith J. held the 
relationship between the football scout and club ‘akin to employment’.  In examining the 
judgment, we see two strands.  First, the court adopted fact-based reasoning.  It stressed that, 
given the Football Club’s dire financial state, it had been forced to rely on volunteers to act as 
scouts and these had played an essential role in discovering players that it could later sell on 
for profit, saving the Club potentially from insolvency. On this basis, Roper was integrated into 
the operation of the Club in that he was de facto an unpaid member of staff.  Secondly, however, 
the court had stressed policy factors, notably that the credibility and power the Club gave Roper 
facilitated the abuse.78  How would a future court respond to such a such a scenario?  The 
question DSN raises is whether a court would now simply focus on the details of the 
relationship (e.g. the practical differences between, say, a Premier League club and a lower 
league team) or whether the abuse allegation would tip the analysis into a broader policy 
discussion, following in the steps of cases such as CCWS and JGE. Was DSN a doubtful case 
on the facts?  At the very least, DSN indicates that courts will find it difficult to refrain from 
addressing policy concerns in this kind of case. 
 
In contrast, the 2010 case of Brink’s Global Services Inc v Igrox Ltd79 involved the application 
of the connection test.  Here, the Court of Appeal had found a sufficiently close connection 
between the employee’s theft of silver bars from a container he was supposed to fumigate and 
his employment to make it fair and just that his employer should be held vicariously liable for 
his actions.  This was not an abuse case, and so the Morrison general approach (no policy) 
would now apply.  Reference would have to be made to decided cases to establish a principled 
and consistent approach.  In Brink’s, the Court of Appeal had rejected the argument that this 
was a case where the employment merely gave the employee the opportunity to steal.  In so 
doing, however, it had been influenced by the fact that the theft from the very container the 
employee was instructed to fumigate could be regarded as a risk reasonably incidental to the 
purpose for which he was employed.80  Morrison would advocate a less policy-orientated 
discussion: was the theft so closely connected with the authorised acts of the employee in that 
it furthered the employer’s (rather than his own) business?  Much here will rest on how we 
characterise the authorised acts of the employee.  The employee was intended to have contact 
with the bars in the fumigation process.  However, rather than fumigating the bars, he stole 
them. If we refer to the ‘past’ case of Morrison, we can see that Skelton similarly had been 
given access to employee data which he had misused to commit the tort.  This was regarded as 
a mere opportunity case.  In the light of Morrison, the correctness of Brink’s seems 
questionable.   It is possible to justify Brink’s on the basis that the employee had been entrusted 
 
77 DSN v Blackpool Football Club Ltd [2020] EWHC 595 (QB). 
78 ‘Blackpool, by giving Roper the “aura” … he had there … created the trust in Roper that allowed him to abuse 
the boys’: ibid, para 160.  
79 [2010] EWCA Civ 1207; [2011] IRLR 343. 




with the security of the silver bars in a manner that furthered his employer’s own enterprise.81   
This was not, however, the reasoning of the Court that drew on more liberal authority including 
physical and sexual abuse cases.82  This example is important in that it demonstrates both the 
difficulties of relying on decided cases and ongoing uncertainty in determining what is closely 
connected to authorised acts of the employee. At the very least, it demonstrates that in 
employing an incremental approach, some cases must be regarded as more authoritative than 
others.  The selection process, however, remains a work in progress.   
 
(ii) Impact on Non-Delegable Duties? 
 
A further question left open by the Supreme Court is the possible impact of Barclays on non-
delegable duties in tort.  The expansion of vicarious liability was mirrored by the parallel 
development of non-delegable duties rendering employers personally liable for the torts of their 
independent contractors.  As formulated by the Supreme Court in Woodland v Essex CC,83 
employers hiring workers to care for vulnerable parties in their care (in this case, a school hiring 
independent contractors to run its swimming lessons) might find themselves under a positive 
duty to protect a particular class of persons against a particular class of risks.  This is regardless 
of the fact the contractors were neither employees, nor akin to employees.  Woodland is still 
under development and there are, as yet, few cases on this point.  One key point of uncertainty 
is whether the non-delegable duty will extend to intentional torts; Woodland itself concerning 
only negligence.84  This factor, combined with the courts’ pre-Barclays generous interpretation 
of the ‘akin to employment’ test, explains why litigants have had little incentive to date to 
pursue with any vigour the development of the non-delegable duty argument.85  Vicarious 
liability will generally provide an easier option for claimants. 
 
Will the 2020 decisions change this position, reviving the debate as to non-delegable duties?  I 
am doubtful for three reasons.  First, without a clear statement that Woodland will extend to 
intentional torts, the survival of Armes (albeit as a ‘doubtful’ case) suggests that abuse claims 
will continue to be framed as vicarious liability. While academics such as Tofaris 86  and 
Deakin87 have argued that non-delegable duties provide a more suitable response to child abuse 
cases, Armes did not follow this path. Barclays confirms its status as based on vicarious liability. 
Armes also represents authority that it will be difficult to establish non-delegable duties against 
 
81 Cf Morris v CW Martin & Sons Ltd [1966] 1 QB 716.  
82 eg Mattis v Pollock [2003] EWCA Civ 887; [2003] 1 WLR 2157 (physical assault) and Maga v Archbishop of 
Birmingham [2010] EWCA Civ 256; [2010] 1 WLR 1441 (sexual abuse).   
83 Woodland supra n 8. 
84 Although Lord Reed in Armes supra n 7, para 51 commented – ‘Nor am I able to agree that a non-delegable 
duty cannot be breached by a deliberate wrong’ – this was obiter. There is some support for such a development, 
however, from doctrinal writers eg R Stevens, ‘Non-Delegable Duties and Vicarious Liability’ in JW Neyers, E 
Chamberlain and SGA Pitel, (eds), Emerging Issues in Tort Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) 361. 
85 See, for example, Kafagi v JBW Group Ltd supra n 34 where the non-delegable duty argument was not even 
raised. Arguably the non-delegable duty argument could have been argued in Barclays e.g. Barclays Bank, in 
employing young female staff and insisting they saw an independent contractor for a physical check-up, could be 
said to have owed a positive duty to ensure reasonable care was taken in the examination.  However, given the 
uncertainty whether the non-delegable duty argument extends to sexual abuse and potential difficulties 
establishing an antecedent relationship, this was understandably not pursued. For an alternative suggestion of a 
claim against the bank for breach of implied contract terms, see P Watts, ‘The travails of vicarious liability’ (2019) 
135 LQR 7. 
86 S Tofaris, ‘Vicarious liability and non-delegable duty for child abuse in foster care: A step too far?’ (2016) 79 
MLR 871. 
87 S Deakin, ‘Organisational torts: Vicarious liability versus non-delegable duty’ (2018) 77 CLJ 15.  See also C 




public authorities where the statutory framework under which the defendant operates might 
render any such duty unduly onerous.88  Secondly, if, as is suggested in this article, the ‘akin 
to employment’ test continues to be interpreted generously in sexual abuse cases, then there is 
little incentive to argue for an extension to the non-delegable duty principle at least in this 
context.  Finally, even for cases where it may now be more difficult to establish a relationship 
‘akin to employment’, litigants will face an area of law that remains under-developed and 
inevitably lack of authority will discourage claims.  This does not mean that non-delegable 
duties cannot be argued in conjunction with vicarious liability,89 but that vicarious liability 
remains, in most cases, the stronger and more predictable option.  At best, then, we can only 
say that the reining in of the relationship test might give encouragement to parties to raise non-
delegable duties arguments, but it is hardly a game-changer. 
 
 
5. Conclusion: Have Barclays and Morrison halted the ongoing expansion of vicarious 
liability? 
 
As we have seen in this article, the clear intention of Barclays and Morrison was to slow down, 
if not halt, the expansion of vicarious liability.  In particular, the UK Supreme Court in these 
cases sought to reduce the number of cases where policy could be used to justify future 
extensions of the doctrine.  In so doing, the Court advocated a move towards a more principled, 
incremental approach.  This will come as a great relief to many commentators, including myself, 
who have expressed increasing concern at the ongoing ‘movement’ of this strict liability 
doctrine.  Such moves were based, undoubtedly, on the well-intentioned efforts of the courts 
to ensure vulnerable victims could access compensation, but ultimately failed to provide clear 
guidance for courts and placed an increasing burden on employers.  
 
However, this article has argued that the Supreme Court has not been wholly successful in its 
aim and that there is a risk that Barclays and Morrison will fail to have the impact the Supreme 
Court anticipated.  Notably, the decision to review rather than overturn earlier authority has 
required the Court to create exceptions where reference to policy (notably risk-based reasoning) 
is still permitted.  It remains unclear exactly what defines a ‘doubtful’ case and I fully expect 
Counsel to test this matter in future cases.  Future courts will also be left be determine the scope 
of the sexual abuse exception.  By retaining Mohamud, the Court also creates uncertainty as to 
the meaning of ‘furthering the interests’ of one’s employer and, in advising courts to refer to 
decided cases, fails to provide clear guidance which cases are authoritative.   Mohamud, for 
example, is Supreme Court authority, but one that should now be interpreted in the light of 
Morrison.  Cases such as Brink’s (discussed above) will have to be construed narrowly if they 
are not to mislead.  One is left with the conclusion that if the aim of Morrison is to stop 
expansion of the close connection test, this would have been better achieved by simply 
overruling Mohamud rather than seeking to rehabilitate it. 
 
Barclays and Morrison are important decisions.  They signify concern at the highest level that 
the doctrine of vicarious liability was being applied too generously by the courts.  However, 
judicial tact and diplomacy have led to decisions that hold their punches.  This article has 
 
88 See, for example, Razumas v Ministry of Justice [2018] EWHC 215 (QB); [2018] P.I.Q.R. P10 and Hopkins (A child) v 
Akramy [2020] EWHC 3445 (QB) where the High Court rejected the imposition of a non-delegable duty on prison 
authorities and a primary care trust respectively as inconsistent with the statutory framework within which they were 
operating. 
89 See eg Ramdhean v Agedo (unreported 28 January 2020, County Court (Leeds)): negligent treatment by member 




identified a number of points of uncertainty that these cases have created or, at best, failed to 
resolve. To answer the question posed by this article: has the UK Supreme Court halted the 
ongoing expansion of vicarious liability?  It has certainly tried, but in view of the above analysis, 
it is unlikely to prevent further challenges by claimants eager to test the boundaries of vicarious 
liability.  This is not to say that an attempt at a more principled and incremental approach is 
not to be welcomed nor that Barclays and Morrison do not represent much-needed intervention 
by the UK Supreme Court.  However, the decision to ‘correct’ misunderstandings rather than 
overturn misleading case-law should be a concern to anyone working in this area of law. 
 
 
 
 
